نوع مقاله : علمی پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانش‌آموختة دکتری حقوق بین‌الملل، دانشکدة حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
2 استاد گروه حقوق عمومی، دانشکدة حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction
In today’s complex and interconnected world, States are forced to balance their international obligations with the imperatives of protecting their essential interests. While international law requires States to perform their obligations in good faith, it also provides limited exceptions to exceptional circumstances. One of the most important of these exceptions is “necessity,” which, according to Article 25 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States (2001), allows States to temporarily derogate from certain obligations in the event of a grave and imminent peril to their essential interests, provided that they comply with strict conditions. Meanwhile, a review of arbitration cases arising from the Argentine economic crisis in the early 2000s, often brought by gas investors, as well as cases brought before other international tribunals, particularly the International Court of Justice, has provided a concrete example of the practical challenges of defending necessity against international obligations of States. In light of such a reality, the question arises as to how effective the defense of necessity can be in times of crisis and in order to protect the essential interests of States.
Methodology
This article uses a library study to gather information and identify existing challenges, complemented by a comparative analysis of the sources. The aim of this study is to present conclusions taking into account international jurisprudence as well as the practice of States in invoking the defense of necessity. The authors argue that the necessity defense, despite its important theoretical position, has not been accepted in practice and has merely played a complementary and subsidiary role alongside other State defenses in some cases.
Conclusions
The study concludes that the basis for the “necessity defense” can be found in the “principle of fairness,” which aims to strike a balance between the essential interests of the State and the rights of the contracting party. According to it, compliance with obligations should not cause harm to the essential interests of the State. Therefore, necessity is an excuse that comes to the rescue when the essential interests of the State are at stake, so that the State can take the necessary measures on the basis of it and not be found to be in breach of its international obligations and subsequently be discharged from liability for full compensation. On the other hand, the reasonable expectations of the contracting party regarding the good faith implementation of the obligation, the stability and predictability of the other party’s behavior and obligations, make it necessary to prevent the State from abusing necessity. For this reason, the wording of Article 25 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States has been written in such a way that the State can resort to it in truly urgent situations, in order to prevent possible abuse by States and not to jeopardize the order existing in international obligations. However, necessity has in practice become a defense that has not been successfully invoked so far. In all cases, the necessity defense has been rejected by the tribunal. Even in cases where the tribunal has paid attention to necessity and taken a relatively positive approach, this attention has been for the purpose of the approval of other State defenses, such as the security exception. In other words, necessity has so far failed to independently assist States in times of need and has only played a complementary role in some cases.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
)